Tag Archives: Muhiddin Kabiri

Fergananews:”High-Ranking Member of Tajik Islamic Renaissance Party Sentenced in Absentia”

A provincial court in Tajikistan has convicted Shamsiddin Saidov in absentia to 15 years in prison, Ozodi Radio reports. Saidov is a former member of the political council of the banned Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (PIVT).

Saidov was found guilty of extremism, terrorism and other crimes. The court heard nine witnesses and considered photographs on which Saidov is pictured sitting next to the PIVT leader, Mukhiddin Kabiri.

According to open sources, Saidov joined PIVT in the 1980s when the party was still operating underground. The authorities arrested him after one of the anti-Soviet protests in 1986 and forcibly deported him to Siberia.

When the civil war broke out in Tajikistan, Saidov left for Afghanistan where he represented PIVT’s leader at the time, Said Abdullo Nuri who died in 2006.

After the war in 1997, Saidov returned to his homeland and joined the National Reconciliation Commission. Until 2010 he led the International Department of PIVT. Saidov lives abroad now.

In 2017, Tajikistan passed a number of reforms amending the criminal legislation in order to allow convictions in absentia for especially dangerous criminals hiding abroad. Some observers noted at the time that the amendments seemed designed specifically to persecute PIVT leaders who had fled abroad. However, the authorities categorically denied such an interpretation of the legislative changes.

Until September 2015, PIVT had been the only officially functioning religious party in the post-Soviet space for 16 years. In August 2015, the Ministry of Justice of Tajikistan demanded PIVT to cease its activities. And in September, the republic’s authorities accused the PIVT leadership of involvement in a military mutiny led by the former Deputy Minister of Defense, Abdukhalim Nazarzoda.

The Supreme Court then labelled the party a terrorist organization and ordered the arrest of its leadership. In June 2016, the court sentenced 14 members of PIVT’s political council to various prison terms, two of them for life.

The party leader. Muhiddin Kabiri, left the republic right after the parliamentary elections on 1 March 2015 – six months before the “rebellious” events of September. He later said that he had fled fearing that he would face a criminal case fabricated against him at home.

In September 2016, Interpol’s website listed the name of Kabiri among its wanted suspects. Nevertheless, the leader of the PIVT announced his intention to continue the activities of the party in exile. Kabiri rejects all charges against PIVT – he thinks that the September insurgency was the reason for the ban on the activities of the Islamic party.

January 26,2018

Fergana News Agency

U.S. puts Tajikistan in 10 countries of particular concern. Another big defeat of dictator Rahmon

Press Statement

Heather Nauert
U.S. State Department Spokesperson
Washington, DC

January 4, 2018

In far too many places around the globe, people continue to be persecuted, unjustly prosecuted, or imprisoned for exercising their right to freedom of religion or belief. Today, a number of governments infringe upon individuals’ ability to adopt, change, or renounce their religion or belief, worship in accordance with their religion or beliefs, or be free from coercion to practice a particular religion or belief.

In accordance with the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, the Secretary of State annually designates governments that have engaged in or tolerated systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom as “Countries of Particular Concern”. Today, the Department of State announces that the Secretary of State re-designated Burma, China, Eritrea, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan as Countries of Particular Concern on December 22, 2017. The Secretary also placed Pakistan on a Special Watch List for severe violations of religious freedom.

The protection of religious freedom is vital to peace, stability, and prosperity. These designations are aimed at improving the respect for religious freedom in these countries. We recognize that several designated countries are working to improve their respect for religious freedom; we welcome these initiatives and look forward to continued dialogue. The United States remains committed to working with governments, civil society organizations, and religious leaders to advance religious freedom around the world.

U.S. Department of State

January 4, 2018

NEWSWEEK: WHY EXTREMIST GROUPS ARE GAINING STRENGTH IN CENTRAL ASIA

When security forces revealed the suspect in an attack on the St Petersburg metro that killed 14 on April 3 was likely a Kyrgyz national, attention turned to the Central Asia region, the source of several attacks on Russia in recent decades. After Friday’s truck attack in Stockholm that killed four, the region made headlines again. Swedish police said the suspect, who has confessed to the attack, was Rakhmat Akilov, from Uzbekistan.

Though Russian authorities believe the St. Petersburg suspect Akbarzhon Jalilov, 22, was a suicide bomber, they arrested eight people in connection with the attack on Monday, and chief of Russian intelligence Alexander Bortnikov said they were also from Central Asian republics.

Both attacks have drawn attention to region with a history of separatism, and in recent years, a source of Islamist extremism. Though neither attack has been claimed by any group so far, both have mirrors in those by the Islamic State militant group (ISIS). The group coordinated similar bombings at train stations in Brussels in March 2016 that killed 32, and a suicide attack on Ataturk airport in Istanbul in June that killed 44 civilians, in which the suspects were also from Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. ISIS’s propaganda wing has encouraged its “soldiers” to attack western targets by using vehicle rammings, and an ISIS-inspired attack in Nice in July 2016 killed 86.

There are concerns about the growth of religious extremism in Central Asia—since the rise of the Islamic State militant group (ISIS) in 2014 experts estimate up to 4,000 people from central Asia have gone to fight for the group in Iraq and Syria. Russia’s shared borders with much of Central Asia have made it nervous. In a speech to the U.N. general assembly in September 2015, Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed concern over the growing threat of international terrorism in the region.

Much of Central Asia was formerly part of the Soviet Union, under which sources of identity such as religion and nationality were repressed. “In the 1990s when Communism collapsed, tradition withered away, and there wasn’t much prosperity. Conditions were ripe for a new ideology, and some people, especially young men looking to become heroes, were drawn to that,” says Anna Matleeva, visiting senior research fellow in the department for war studies at King’s College London.

A variety of extreme religious movements operate across Central Asia including the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islam (Party of Islamic Liberation, HuT) the Jamaat of Central Asian Mujahidin and the Uyghur Islamic Party of Eastern Turkestan separatist group. Foreign organizations banned across the region include al Qaeda, Afghanistan’s Taliban, and the Muslim Brotherhood.

“Recruiters for ISIS are present in cities across the region. They target mostly poorer regions, suburbs, towns, areas with big bazaars, a crossroads perhaps, with a good communication network; places that allow a mixing of people anonymously,” Matleeva adds. There are several hotspots of extremism in the central Asian region, within the republics, as well as in regions with a strong separatist bent, such as Xinjiang in China.

Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan, an authoritarian country, led by the dictator Islam Karimov until 2016, borders Afghanistan to the South, Turkmenistan to the west, and Russia to the north. The largest single group of people joining ISIS from Central Asia is from Uzbekistan, say Crisis Group experts.

A 39-year-old Uzbek man is in custody over an attack in Sweden which killed four in the capital, including a Belgian, a Briton, and two Swedes. Police said that he had “expressed sympathy for extremist organizations” including ISIS.

Reuters reports suggest that Uzbek recruits for ISIS could be in the thousands. The International Center for Conflict Resolution ( ICSR ) estimates that more than 500 Uzbek nationals have traveled to Syria to fight for ISIS in its self-styled caliphate. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan became part of ISIS in 2015, and is active in northern Afghanistan alongside the Taliban. The IMU wants to overthrow the Uzbek government and create Turkistan, or an Islamic caliphate which stretches from Xinjiang to the Caspian Sea.

Kyrgyzstan

The home of Jalilov, the alleged St Petersburg attacker, has experienced a “slow arc towards fundamentalism,” according to a June article in The Diplomat, a magazine specialising in Asian affairs. One of the bombers of the Boston marathon in 2013 was born in Kyrgyzstan, as was one of the attackers who hit Ataturk airport. Recruitment for extremist groups, particularly ISIS, is a concern for the tiny country. Estimates vary on the number of citizens that have gone to fight for ISIS, but several reports put the figure at around 500.

Of those who left to fight in Iraq and Syria, around 40 jihadists have returned and authorities are concerned about the influence they may have, and have cracked down on suspected extremist cells as a result.

Through 2015 and 2016 authorities carried out several raids in the capital Bishkek, and in Osh, on targets suspected or terror-related activities. They killed four during the anti-terror operation in July 2015, and detained several more, claiming the black flag of ISIS was flying above the house. In August 2016, police said they had broken up a suspected ISIS cell in Bishkek, and later that year the 10th Main Directorate, a government arm that usually deals with terror-related investigations, conducted weapons raids in Bishkek and Osh.

Other extremist movements besides ISIS have been active in the country, including a domestic arm of Iraqi Shia group Jaishul Mahdi that the government held responsible for bombings in 2010 and 2011. In 2011 the security services highlighted the emergence of an organization called the Islamic Movement of Kyrgyzstan (IMK) and analysts at the Crisis Group believe it has grown and provides assistance to people aiming to fight in Syria with ISIS.

Xinjiang, China

China is convinced that Xinjiang, an autonomous territory located in the far west of the country, and home to Uighur separatists and a Muslim-majority population, poses a threat to the country’s stability to such an extent that entering Urumqi, the capital, feels like entering a warzone. Armored vehicles and riot police line the streets, and there are constant alerts of possible uprisings. The government blamed the minority Uighurs for a knife attack in Xinjiang that left eight dead in February. Ethnic tensions between the Uighurs and China’s majority Han population have been exacerbated by Beijing’s crackdown on rights and civil liberties in the region.

In late February Chinese authorities were on high alert after an ISIS video released by the Al-Furat division of ISIS, their propaganda arm, suggested an attack in the region was imminent.

Since then Beijing directed that all cars in Xinjiang must have GPS, claiming that the form of monitoring was to protect against attacks. The army also marched through Urumqi, in a show of anti-extremist strength.

Tajikistan

Bordering China, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan is a majority Muslim country but follows a secular political institution. In November 2016, the U.S. told visitors to be wary of terror attacks, and to avoid public gatherings as growing religious unrest continued in Tajikistan, with its porous border with Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Though the government has claimed that around 1,000 Tajiks have gone to fight for ISIS, analysts are skeptical, as the government has linked unrest to Islamic extremism when quashing dissent. Previously it was only Central Asian country with Islam represented politically, but President Emomoli Rahmon succeeded after 2015 in concentrating power in his hands after closing the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan. In July that year, Gulmorod Khalimov, the head of Tajikistan’s special forces became a high-profile defection to ISIS—he appeared in a propaganda video for the group, criticizing the Tajik government’s policy toward Islam.

Newsweek

04.12.2017

The Diplomat: Exiled Tajik Opposition Leader Speaks

“When the repression machine begins to work, it destroys everyone.”

Muhiddin Kabiri was on the run before he knew it. After the rigged election in his home country of Tajikistan, in which his party officially received a mere 1.5 percent of the vote, he needed time to rest. A conference in Malaysia he had been invited to was a good reason to leave. After that, he planned a short stay in Turkey to relax before deciding what to do next. The 2015 election was the first time since the 1997 peace deal ending the civil war that his Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) did not make it into the parliament.

That, however, did not come as a surprise. Since 2010 the regime of President Emomali Rahmon has been tightening its grip on power, crushing any dissent. In the traditionally pious Tajik society, this meant targeting religion, which the authorities justified in the context of the global war on terror. The government banned wearing the hijab in public, introduced control over sermons, and forbade the attendance of those under the age of 18 at religious ceremonies. Men wearing long beards were forced to shave. One of the most affected groups was the electorate and activists of the IRPT, at the time the second biggest political force and the only parliamentary opposition in the country. Arguably, it was also the only group capable of challenging Rahmon’s rule.

It was March 2015 when Kabiri packed his bags, preparing to spend one month abroad. He soon found out that a return would not be easy. As soon as he left the country, a regime-run newspaper, Djumhuriat, published a statement from the General Prosecutor launching a criminal investigation into Kabiri’s involvement in an illegal sale of property 15 years earlier. The case was widely seen as a political move to discredit his party. It also brought back the memory of Zaid Saidov, a leader of the New Tajikistan party, who was charged with fraud and polygamy a few months into his oppositional involvement. He is now serving a 26-year prison term.

At the time, a third of the IRPT’s Political Council thought that Kabiri should return. But the majority decided that it was too risky. When I asked Kabiri how he felt leaving his peers and family, he took a moment to think about the answer. “For sure, this feeling is only familiar to those who were in a similar situation,” he replied calmly, taking a deep breath. “It’s very difficult. On the one hand, you want to be with your peers and friends to go through the difficulties together. On the other hand – responsibility requires that you do not put yourself and the party in danger. If something happens to the party and the leader is free, he can still support his people.”

The Hunt

Even with the imminent threat of the leader’s arrest and the lost parliamentary seats, IRPT members failed to foresee what was to come.

“On September 9 we had the Political Council meeting. I took part online and the rest of the leadership was in my home in Dushanbe, as they had closed down our office a month earlier. Some members wanted to organize protests in front of the Ministry of Justice if they don’t let us hold the party congress at the end of the month. But the majority said the government was only waiting for such a provocation and suggested that we refrain from such actions.” Kabiri seemed composed while relaying the tale; he probably had told the story many times before.

“After two days I received information that there is a question on a high level: what to do with the party? Our sources said that once the decision about arresting the party leadership is made, we will have approximately two days to help our people flee.” But when the time came, Kabiri found it difficult to convince his associates to leave.

“Even my son, who is now in Germany, challenged my decision. He said that if he leaves it will look like a family escape. If there are arrests, he should be with the rest of the party. He had those romantic thoughts.”

Romantic it may have been, but the view was shared by the majority of party leadership. No one believed that the response of the authorities could be so ruthless. He therefore decided to give the activists individual orders to leave the country. “I called my first deputy and said that as the party leader, I tell you to leave Tajikistan. If you don’t, it will mean that you are violating the party discipline.” Thanks to those calls, around a third of the leadership managed to escape the country. But some missed the chance by a matter of minutes. Kabiri’s driver was caught as he was boarding a plane. Kabiri’s first deputy was arrested at the airport. During a two-day hunt, the authorities arrested over 200 party members. Around 1,000 activists managed to escape to Europe.

They Began With Beating

Kabiri’s relatives and friends who stayed in the country were arrested, including his elderly aunts. The authorities began with beatings, but soon after moved to more sophisticated measures.

“Imagine, a person who has been impelled to speak against his own son or brother. What kind of torture they had to go through, both physical and psychological? There were around ten videos only with my relatives speaking against the party. They forced everybody – even my daughter-in-law, my brother, and my teacher, and whoever had any contact with me.” The same happened to the families of his peers.

Soon after, the trials behind closed doors began. No witnesses, journalists, relatives, or OSCE observers were allowed in the court. Kabiri’s deputies were sentenced to life imprisonment; other party members and activists received 20, 25, or 30-year sentences. Following the IRPT’s trial, the authorities kept the ruling secret, although the party got hold of it through unofficial channels. The IRPT was charged with extremism and terrorism. No foreign government or organization has so far reiterated the accusation.

The authorities subsequently moved on to arresting the party’s lawyers. Buzurgmehr Yorov, the IRPT’s main attorney, is currently serving a 26-year sentence. His brother, Jamshed, managed to escape and is now awaiting a decision on his asylum application in a European country.

It has been two years since Kabiri last spoke to his grandchildren, who are under house arrest. They are not allowed to speak to their own father, and had not been allowed to see Kabiri’s father, who lived in Dushanbe just a few kilometers away. He passed away several months ago unable to say goodbye to his family.

“When the repression machine begins to work, it destroys everyone. It does not distinguish between the guilty and the innocent, young and old, it crushes everyone. And once there are no oppositionists left, it begins to turn against itself,” Kabiri says.

The World’s Silence

The response of the international community to the brutal crushing of the opposition in Tajikistan has been meek. The UN, which negotiated and was the guarantor of the 1997 peace deal, has done nothing to bring the issue to the international agenda. The EU continues to support the country with millions in development assistance and in February 2016, the United States promised to grant the country an additional $50 million in military aid to support its anti-terrorist efforts. The reluctance of the West to acknowledge and address the suffering of Tajiks can be seen as a deal with the regime, driven by anti-Islamic paranoia.

“Without democracy and strong civil society there will be neither stability nor development. We are trying to convince the EU that they should pay more attention to our region, but unfortunately, our European partners think that we are exaggerating the problems. It is easier to cooperate with official government structures in the fights against radicalism than with NGOs and opposition parties,” Kabiri says.

Kabiri sees an analogy between the current situation in Central Asia and the Middle East on the onset of the Arab Spring. “There is an example of Tunisia, where after the fall of Ben Ali, there was a responsible opposition both of an Islamic and secular character that managed to stabilize the situation. But why it did not happen in Libya? Because Gaddafi had destroyed the whole opposition. The only ones who remained were himself and a mob of radicals.”

As he explains, the high proportion of Tajik citizens in the ranks of the Islamic State is not accidental. People are disillusioned not only with their own governments, but also with the West, which they see as the main supporter of local dictators. They no longer believe in democracy and peaceful change. Through repression, the government is creating extremists, who, according to Kabiri, will soon be the only alternative to Rahmon’s rule.

Life Abroad

In February 2017, Kabiri received refugee status in an EU country. Until then, he stayed in a refugee center with other asylum seekers from Tajikistan and elsewhere. “I had the financial means not to stay in the camp, but I didn’t want to. Maybe because I wanted to somehow compensate for the feeling of guilt,” he wonders. “But I don’t have any regrets. I had to start everything from the beginning and the few months were a university of life for me. Only because of that I now have some peace of mind. I feel the same way as I used to 20 years ago, when I was starting to build my life.”

He began with the reform of party structure to adjust to the realities of exile. He does not rule out that the party may change its name and objectives in the near future. Altering the program is necessary in the new circumstances. In Tajikistan, the party was focused on solving internal issues through dialogue and compromise with the authorities, for which it was often harshly criticized. Critics claimed that such excessive compliance is a sign of weakness, which the government used against the party and society. Now, there is no place for dialogue.

But for all the tragedy of the situation, Kabiri remains optimistic.  “When I received asylum, my wife, who lives in Istanbul, said that on the very same day she received a phone call from someone from Dushanbe asking if it’s true. She said this person had heard it from someone in prison. This is how fast the good news reached my peers. They said that once I received status, it means that Europe does not see me as a criminal. And that there is hope for them too.”

Return

Before we finished our talk, sitting in the comfortable office of a Polish NGO run by my friends in central Warsaw, I once again asked about Kabiri’s feelings. He did not seem to be accustomed to this kind of question.

“Will you ever return?” I asked. “For some reason I am sure that I will,” he replied without much hesitation.

“In the cemetery in my village I planted a couple of trees. They took away everything I had, but I asked someone to take care of the trees. I planted them because I want to be buried there. I don’t know whether it will ever happen. But my return will mean that my peers are free.”

Agnieszka Pikulicka-Wilczewska is a journalist focusing on the post-Soviet space and an editor with New Eastern Europe magazine.

 

The Diplomat

May 1, 2017

Farghana news: “Muhiddin Kabiri on Interpol, IRPT ban, General Nazarzoda and exiled opposition’s future”

Last month, Shohin Talbakzoda, a representative of the Prosecutor General’s office, expressed his concern over the fact that international organisations, European nations and even CSTO member-countries have not yet included the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) and Group 24 into so-called “blacklists.” The Tajik authorities have announced the two political groups terroristic and extremist organisations. Furthermore, some countries actually “support them and consider them as political opposition of Tajikistan.”

“Muhiddin Kabiri, chairman of the banned Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan, is in the Interpol list and is to be arrested immediately. But some European countries are providing asylum to criminals instead of arresting and extraditing them to Tajikistan,” Mr. Talbakzoda has said.

Apparently, Tajikistan’s authorities are alarmed by news that IRPT leader has recently been granted political asylum in a European country. Before Mr. Kabiri, several activists of the Group 24, an opposition group, who were accused of various grave crimes in Tajikistan, were also granted asylum.

For 16 years, until September 2015, the IRPT was the only officially registered Islamic party in the former Soviet Union. But in August 2015, the ministry of justice of Tajikistan demanded the IRPT cease activities. Later in September, the IRPT’s leaders, including Mr. Kabiri, were charged with participation in alleged mutiny by the ex-Deputy Defence Minister Abduhalim Nazarzoda. The Supreme Court declared the party a terrorist organisation, leading to the arrest of its high-ranking members. In June 2016, 14 members of the political bureau of the IRPT were sentenced to various imprisonment terms, including two life sentences.

IRPT’s chairman Muhiddin Kabiri departed from Tajikistan immediately after the parliamentary elections on March 1, 2015, i.e. exactly six months prior to dramatic events. For the first time, the party secured not even a single seat in the parliament. Mr. Kabiri later stated he was concerned that a trumped-up charge could be pressed and criminal investigation would be launched. Mr. Kabiri, on the other hand, refutes all allegations against his party, and states the September allegedly military mutiny was an excuse to ban the IRPT’s activities.

The Tajik authorities declared Mr. Kabiri internationally wanted; Mr Kabiri’s name were posted on the Interpol website later in September. Nonetheless, Mr Kabiri stated the party would continue its activities in exile. The relatives of the IRPT leader as well as family members of many other party activists, were subjected to extreme pressures on the part of power-wielding bodies after the party was outlawed. Some of such people, including Mr Kabiri’s cousin Jamshed Nazrulloyev, his brother-in-law Mahmadulloh Rahmatulloyev along with driver were convicted for allegedly failing to report preparations of a crime. Others were followed and repeatedly taken away for “conversations” by secret services. Tillo Kabiri, Mr Kabiri’s 95-year-old father, was also invited for such a “conversation” and asked to urge his son to return to Tajikistan. In January 2016, Kabiri Senior was removed at the Dushanbe airport from a flight to Istanbul. Tillo Kabiri was traveling to Turkey for medical treatment; he deceased late October the same year.

Despite all persecutions by the Tajik authorities, Mr. Kabiri continues political activities in exile: he speaks at various events, issues statements and gives interviews in attempts to draw the international community’s attention to the political situation in Tajikistan.

Fergana Editor-in-Chief Daniil Kislov interviewed the IRPT leader over the Internet. Mr. Kabiri spoke about his current status, and how the IRPT was a legal organisation and became “terrorist” overnight and why many of his supporters have not left Tajikistan even though they were aware of impending arrests. The interlocutor also spoke of the exiled Tajik opposition’s plans.

You were granted asylum in a European country? Is that true? Please confirm.

Yes, it is true. However, with your permission, I will not name the country. The only criterion for choosing this particular country was its closeness with Tajik migrants.

You are in the Interpol’s wanted lists. Can you travel anywhere, leave the country you are in now?

Yes, I do travel, as I used to do before. However, the span of my trips is somewhat limited now because it is now risky to travel to those countries, which do not necessarily respect laws and human rights. Regarding Interpol, after the Tajik prosecutor general’s office announced they inquired them about me, I have officially addressed the Interpol by means of my lawyers—they at that time responded that there is an inquiry, but I am not included into lists yet. It turns out the Interpol is also a bureaucratic police organisation albeit a much larger one. The subjects of this organisation are governments. The Interpol did include me into a wanted persons list later. The country that has granted me political asylum will now look into this situation. By the way, the majority of opposition activists from our region either were or still are in that list but that is not preventing them, or me for that matter, from traveling the world.

Do I understand the situation correctly: You have Europe in mind. In other words, you can travel within Europe, but you cannot travel to Russia, Kyrgyzstan or Belarus?

I will not identify any country by name. As I said, there is a number of countries where there is no tradition of observing international law or respecting human rights, where corrupted authorities rule. But I don’t need to visit those countries at this time anyway.

The official Dushanbe must have some grounds and evidence to submit information about you to the Interpol. Your party and you personally have been declared terrorists in your homeland. But is there any court verdict to that effect?

I possess no documents or verified information that a verdict was issued against me specifically. To consider our party a terrorist has no factual basis. That was a political decision, not a judicial one. I would like to mention that only two days after the September 2015 events, the political establishment first declared the party “terrorist organisation” and then publicly urged the party to the maximum extent possible. When the first person in the state openly instructs the power-wielding bodies like this, it is no longer possible to consider any judicial verdict to be lawful or just.

Those who followed reports around the case, would remember that, in early October 2015, Supreme Court Chairman Shermuhammad Shohiyon hosted a news conference in early October 2015. The journalists asked how that court was able to so swiftly adopt a decision and issue a verdict when the matter was very complex, large and important—after all, the matter at hand was banning a political party. The Prosecutor General’s office motioned to force the IRPT to cease activities late September. So there was a necessity to look into a very big case, flip through many documents, question a big number of eyewitnesses and then only issue a verdict. Normally cases of such magnitude take several months if not a whole year. Shermuhammad Shohiyon provided very important details in his answer and has essentially admitted that the authorities have thoroughly prepared for the case and they only had to come up with an excuse. Of course, he was not conscientious of his response’s content and essence, because he only needed to quell the journalists’ doubts and questions regarding the rapidity of the decision-making process in this case. This was his response: “And why do you think we adopted a decision very quickly? The case has been prepared very thoroughly, even before those [mutiny] events, and we have been studying the matter of closing the party for a long time.”

Thus, the chairman of the Supreme Court has himself laid out the entire scenario according to which the authorities acted how to close our party. The only unresolved matter was the language of prohibition: must the party have been shut down as “disbanded,” “failing to meet legal requirements,” or “extremist and terrorist” one. Because the authorities were not necessarily concealing their plans and were actually preparing for this, many observers, including international observers, do not really trust and believe what the [Tajik] government says. By the way, a serious claim was advanced against the Interpol at an international forum recently, claiming this international policing organisation was turned into a convenient tool of persecuting and even neutralising opposition figures from the “third world.” The dictatorial regimes are using the Interpol for their purposes more often lately. Among the CIS countries, Tajikistan provided the longest list of wanted persons.

The Tajik authorities declared you a “terrorist” for your alleged connections with “terrorist” Nazarzoda; the cases of General Nazarzoda and the IRPT were in “one cart.” The Tajik authorities are saying via all mass media outlets, in their speeches at the OSCE and UN that “terrorists” Nazarzoda and IRPT are two sides of one coin. Can you explain what is your connection with “terrorist” Nazarzoda?

Yes, of course, I will. By the way, the word “terrorist” came out of your mouth several times…

It’s a term the authorities are labelling you with, not me.

I understand. They consider any dissent a terrorist or a potential terrorist. Unfortunately, the term is being misused and abused throughout the whole world. There is no unified approach to this phenomenon. It is perhaps the time to adopt a document at the international level—perhaps the UN General Assembly, which would identify actions to be characterised as “terrorism” and those that cannot be, so the global community know who is a terrorist to be fought. One group can be for someone a terrorist and for others a hero. For some, they are fighters for freedom, for others—separatists, mutineers or simply criminals. In other words, everybody chooses who they label a “terrorist” based on their own interests.

By the way, the opposition forces, too, have been using the term “terrorism” to characterise the government bodies’ actions over the last several years; not without grounds, I must say. Because the goal of any terror is instilling fear in people and cause the feeling of fear and helplessness in people. To that end, dictatorial and totalitarian regimes have far exceeded many commonly known terrorists organisations in terms of violence and instilling fear in their own citizens. For instance, many actions committed by the current Tajik government can be characterised as “terrorist activity,” because they are aimed at making the population scared. Therefore, it is necessary to avoid using this term perpetually and ubiquitously because otherwise the entire will be “fighting terrorism” and it wouldn’t clear who opposes whom and why.

About relations between General Nazarzoda and our party. To discuss this, we must revisit the year 2010, when we have long won the parliamentary elections and both local and international observers confirmed our victory. However, we were only given two parliamentary seats at the time. Everyone knew the votes were stolen and our party activists were very upset emotionally. Everyone was waiting for our party’s reaction: were we going to rally in protest or not.

The situation was very difficult. I remember that election results were announced on Sunday, and by Wednesday, we gathered an extended session of activists to decide what to do with the announced results. There were nearly 1,000 activists in that assembly hall and some hotheads took to the streets immediately from there. The situation was very tense; youth were insisting on protests. I was informed that vans loaded with men in military fatigues and plainclothes showed up near the office and on neighbouring streets. Nazarzoda called me at that moment. By the way, we were not only good neighbours, but also good friends. He was not general at the time and was the head of some department under the defence ministry. I cannot quote him to you right now, but the gist of his ideas was that he was in his minister’s office with representatives of other power-wielding bodies, who were observing the situation in the assembly hall I was in via the Internet. He added that everyone there realised the unjustness of announced election outcomes and was sorry. However, nothing could be done anymore, since the outcome has been already announced. He added with sorrow that the first circle surrounding our building was police officers, the second circle was security forces, and the third circle was the army, military personnel.

Did he mean that was the formation of power-wielders surrounding your office?

Exactly. Of course, I would not have believed that if I was not reported about the situation earlier. I was already aware that the building was surrounded.

In other words, your friend Nazarzoda, not general at the time, has thusly warned you that you needed to be quiet?

Let’s say, he asked me as a friend and was fulfilling his duty as an officer. I could hear they were using the loudspeaker and he was tasked with calling me to deescalate the situation. I could hear voices, saying they were ready for an even larger number of victims than in Andijan [May 2015 in Uzbekistan] not to allow a protest action to take place. They were talking about the Andijan events, when human rights advocates say over 700 people died. They were saying they had orders to shoot and kill.

The situation was dramatic. On the one hand, the party is obligated to defend the voices it received and protest injustice. On the other hand, there was a risk of new bloodshed and big number of human victims. And the most important part is this: Islam, Muslims and our party were again accused of escalating the situation and starting a new conflict. And they continue doing so to date. That was a situation where any choice would lead to failure and I have chosen the most unfavourable one for me personally, which was the least unfavourable one for the people and party at the same time. But, returning to General Nazarzoda: given that not taking to the streets was the right decision we adopted, there is his share in that decision.

I have immediately sent two letters—in the capacities of an MP and a party leader—to the country’s president following that situation, asking for a meeting with him. However, apparently, he thought a dialogue with the opposition was no longer necessary. And maybe he simply had no more arguments. He had an idea what I would be talking about, since I clearly indicated in the aforementioned letters the issues I wanted to discuss. Apparently, he simply had no answers to those questions. People avoid direct contact when they have no arguments.

According to official information, your party secured less than 8% of votes in the parliamentary elections in 2010. Where did you get your data that suggest otherwise?

Yes, officially, we did get the support of less than 8% of voters and two parliamentary seats subsequently. However, the protocols of polling stations, we received several times more votes. I am basing this on [presumably: common sense] that political forces must always be realistic about their possibilities and strengths: They can belittle them, but certainly not exaggerate them. For instance, during the parliamentary elections in 2015, we received less votes compared to the elections in 2010. I am perfectly aware that the situation was different; the authorities’ propaganda efforts were more effective thanks to using the entire administrative resources and harshly preventing opposition parties’ rallies. Well, back in 2010, we had a team of young men and women, and the situation in the country was more democratic than five years later. We had the protocols of polling stations—we had the facts that we won, and experts’ analyses and observers’ reports only confirmed that we secured more votes. We presented these documents to court but not even court listened to our arguments. By the way, we hired the best lawyers but even they were unable to secure the registration of even one motion regarding the election outcomes.

We have gone through all judicial levels and then realised that there simply was no use in seeking justice in this matter. By the way, we have copies of all documents and protocols in our archives.

And how many votes did you receive?

Our estimate is up to 60%.

So, the majority of votes.

Yes; more in certain places and less in other places. But, we secured the majority of votes cast throughout the country. It is possible that 15-20% of votes were simply protests. In other words, some people voted for us not because they supported, but because they disliked us less than the government, so they did not want to give their votes to support the government. But I can state with certainty that 35-40% of votes were conscientiously cast in our favour. That fact was, in my opinion, the reason why the powers-that-be got so scared. You may have heard about the secret Protocol No. 32-20 signed by the president. The document clearly instructs the government agencies and bodies to take certain actions against our party, and agencies responsible for doing so.

When that document was leaked to press, I have sent an official inquiry in the capacity of an MP to the Prosecutor General’s office to show me—an MP and party chairman—the original or a copy of the protocol the Security Council has adopted. I have added in the inquiry that I was ready to sign a document on non-disclosure of a state secret, as it was classified. The Prosecutor General’s office responded thusly: yes, the Council did have a session to discuss this; there is a protocol under so and so number, but the published variant was redacted. I said we had a copy [presumably: from press reports], you show me the original so we can compare to identify the redacted portions of the protocol. Then I would be able to tell the public that the society was being purposefully misled. But since you are not doing it, then I have the right to believe [in the authenticity of] the publicised document.

There was no more reply from the Prosecutor General’s office. I was unofficially told that they were prohibited from corresponding with me on this matter and any more contacts with me were prohibited now. I sent an official inquiry to the administration of the President in the capacity of an MP. No replies. But I did later receive a different response in the form of pressure and harassment of our party. In other words, after that document was adopted, they started to purposefully and systematically pressure the party at all levels in order to neutralise the IRPT as the main opponent in the upcoming parliamentary elections.

Coming back to Nazarzoda: He was a general, who was executing the authorities’ wishes and could shoot people if ordered to avoid civil war. Why did this person specifically, the deputy defence minister by then mind you, would incite mutiny? What is your relation to this mutiny?

This question is one of those that only he alone would be able to respond to. I always knew him as a decent person and a genuine officer. He was truly courageous, a very wise person and fulfilled his duties honestly as an officer. And he genuinely believed that he was doing all that for the sake of the nation, peace and stability.

I met Nazarzoda in 1997, when he was the commander of Battalion 25 of the Defence Ministry that specialised on protecting the National Reconciliation Committee headed by late teacher Sayid Abdullo Nuri and was the guarantor of the committee members’ safety and security. He would often spend time with the Committee due to his duties. We first met there and became friends later after becoming neighbours. We used to meet more frequently during the initial years of friendship, then later we met less frequently, because he was then part of the system and was playing by the rules of the game. Sometimes we would dispute and disagree with each other. His line of thoughts was that of an officer, an employee of the defence ministry. And I would think like a politician, an MP and an opposition figure. But he was a very honest, decent and courageous man, who never concealed his true views. And he would often criticise the opposition. By the way, he was always on the forefront when the government sent its troops against Mullo Abdullo in Rasht and other special operations.

What about the operation in Badakhshan in 2012? Was he there participating as well?

Yes, he was in Khorog. I remember perfectly well how I saw him in military fatigues and he said he arrived from Khorog. As you can see, this man has always executed the leadership’s orders, and that is why he was appointed as deputy Defence minister. By the way, he was appointed to this position after the government launched persecutions against our party. If we shared political opinions and views, he would have never been appointed deputy head of the country’s defence ministry. In other words, this man was fully and completely trusted by the government, just as Colonel Gulmurod Halimov was.

Why did that happen? I myself had many questions and serious doubts: was there really mutiny or not. My analysis of the events suggests that either on the last day or night he acted spontaneously—he took arms, gathered his friends and former subordinates and headed to the mountains. And to date no one knows what were motivations for such actions. After having attentively read the verdict in the case of our fellow party members—we are talking about over 100 pages in the Tajik language, I decided it had to be translated into several languages, primarily English and maybe into Russian as well, so people understand what facts and arguments were used to adopt the said decision. Secondly, many interesting and important things came up during the hearings. Mahmadali Hait, my deputy, asked either the prosecutor or the judge (we have an audio recording of that conversation): “Why are you not paying attention to the statements deputy chairman of the National Security Committee made in court yesterday, when he testified as a witness? Yesterday, he testified and said General Nazarzoda asked him—the deputy chairman of the national security committee—several days prior to the September events if it was true he [Nazarzoda] himself was part of a criminal investigation. The deputy chairman of the National Security Committee is saying that in court! And he responded that, ‘Yes, there is a case, but you should not worry, we will solve the matter and close the investigation.’” In other words, it turns out General Nazarzoda received information several days prior to those events that there is a criminal investigation against him and he would be arrested soon. By the way, the aforementioned deputy chairman was removed from post—apparently for “wrong” testimony.

Now let’s analyse a different aspect: Why does Nazarzoda turn from a loyal officer into a suspect in exactly those days? If you have been following the information torrent at the time, by August 2015 representatives of all layers of population, ranging from sportsmen to teachers and students to clerics have spoken against the IRPT and demanded the authorities shut down our party. All that looked like a nationwide marathon where everyone wanted to show how “patriotic” they were and demanded the government shuts down our party. Military personnel, including former field commanders of opposition, issued similar statements. They only wanted to show the authorities how loyal they were.


General Nazarzoda

The statement was read out by General Shoh Iskandarov; he’s the head of the Tursunzade District internal affairs directorate now. It turns out they were given a text drafted by and delivered from the president’s office. The military personnel were told the commander-in-chief tasked his subordinates with signing and reading out the said statement. It is also worth noting that ex-commanders of the Unified Tajik Opposition specifically must have read the statement to prove their loyalty. Naturally, not all officers and generals agreed to sign: some of them did not sign, while others signed it but said they are fulfilling the commander-in-chief’s orders as officers even though they knew the command was unlawful and contradicted honour and dignity of officers and any decent person.

I don’t know for certain where Nazarzoda signed that document or not. But there is reliable information that he and several other officers expressed themselves very harshly and stated they were being pushed into illegal and unfair games. They were discontented due to two reasons: 1) they are military and legally don’t have the right to get involved in the political life and work of political parties and 2) some of them, including Nazarzoda, used to be part of the armed forces of the Unified Tajik Opposition, so agreeing to such a step would be unworthy for them. Eyewitnesses say a number of officers did not sign the statement because it contradicted both the laws of the land and laws of honour and dignity.

Undoubtedly, everything was duly reported where it had to have been reported. And, most likely, the authorities have completely changed the scenario and plan of action against our party after that. Already back in the spring of 2015, we scheduled the next general assembly for September 20, and announced significant reforms of the party were going to take place. The authorities, obviously, learnt about this and were preparing for it in their own way. They really did not want for the party to undergo reforms, which would lead to internal elections, new leadership, new name, new charter and new programmes.

Along with a new image?

Indeed, a new image as well. That is why they started expediting events. By late August, the justice minister issued an official letter with an ultimatum: we had only 10 days to announce the party’s disbandment. Everything was very simple and easy, right? They are disbanding of their own volition, and we have nothing to do with that decision. They simply had no time to go through the legal procedures and court proceedings per laws. The party had to have been disbanded before the September assembly.

We drafted an official response to the justice ministry, and our delegation, headed by my first deputy Saidumar Husayni met with the minister. They said the minister constantly evaded answers, lowered or diverted his gaze and one could feel the man was not in harmony with his consciousness. He repeatedly said the prepared responses on the necessity of disbanding the party; that would be better for everyone, so to speak. In our response to this ministry, we cited the country’s constitution and effective legislation as well as notified them we were still preparing for the assembly in autumn. We also asked the ministry of justice to fulfil their legal obligations—assisting in holding our party’s event in this case.

To my mind, a deeper and more through analysis and comparison of all information, facts and actions of the authorities in the summer 2015 will reveal answers for many questions. As soon as the officers refused to sign the statement against our party, the justice ministry had immediately sent that ultimatum with the September 5 deadline. After that, the IRPT political bureau convened to discuss possible actions the party could undertake in case the authorities disrupt the assembly and announce the party banned after all. Various scenarios were proposed during that discussion, including protest rallies by the justice ministry. The final decision was that the party would act per circumstances. But the overwhelming attitude was in support of a protest rally. Most likely the authorities have concluded that some officers and soldiers would not take part in cracking down on a peaceful rally even if they are ordered to. That was especially applicable in the case of those who either refused to or unwillingly signed the aforementioned statement. That was scary for the authorities, so they were motivated to neutralised not-so-loyal officers even before the party would be outlawed or the assembly would be cancelled.

Perhaps General Nazarzoda received information that there was a criminal investigation against him and he would be soon arrested. That bothered him, as it can be seen in the words of the deputy national security chief uttered in court only a couple of days before September 4. I think the motives for his subsequent actions are to be sought in these facts. They did not attack any state building; they collected weapons and left for the mountains because they wanted to avoid being arrested.

Most likely General Nazarzoda wanted to avoid the sad fate of other disgraced generals such as ex-Prosecutor General and the presidential administration chief, Mahmadnazar Salihov or ex-Emergencies Minister Mirzo Ziyoyev. Both generals died in mysterious circumstances. Other cases include Generals Yakub Salimov, Gaffor Mirzoyev and Mahmadruzi Iskandarov. This man did not want to simply give up, but wanted to protect himself until the very end and die, if necessary, as a general in a fight, not in a cage.

So that is the extent of “relations” between our party and General Nazarzoda. The situation begs the question: Why was the court held behind closed doors? Why did the authorities not want to show the public, journalists and international observers what exactly our party’s fault was? If they actually had any arguments and facts, it was in their interest to hold an open court and show and prove to everyone we were guilty of something. But because they had no evidence and because the authorities have been preparing for closing our party for a long time—several years in fact, they held these court hearings behind closed doors and used General Nazarzoda’s self-defence attempt to cast the negative light on us all.

Did Emomali Rakhmon’s former companions, former apparatchiks and ministers that you listed above suffered from disagreeing with his line of policies as well or did different fate befall them?

They have different stories albeit they all share one common trait—these people had their own opinions, which they would voice sometimes publicly or candidly. The current authorities always disliked when someone would cross them no matter how trivial the matter is. And now one cannot even think otherwise, because he is no longer just a president, he’s Leader of the Nation. One could silently disagree with the president, but disagreeing with Leader of the Nation is now [equal to] treason. It is doubly dangerous if the dissenting person is respected by the society or has government experience and is financially independent. Such people are not tolerated and that is tragedy of and for everyone, not only military.

Zayd Saidov was imprisoned only because he—a former minister—was a rare case, when one has recognition, respect, money, can reason, and has his own vision as to the country’s future. Dictators perceive such people as ticking time bombs; such people must be destroyed swiftly at all costs [their reasoning goes]. That is why Zayd Saidov was considered a very dangerous competition. This man was declared a criminal as soon as he announced he was establishing a political party. The reason is quite simple: people could follow him. If one is just a face in the crowd and maybe lacks knowledge and reason, the authorities would themselves help such a person establish a party and even include into the parliament as background. All the individuals I listed above did have that “I think” despite their shortcomings. So, yes, there is something in common between General Nazarzoda and these people.

Do you still have relatives in Tajikistan? Are they safe, threatened?

The event unfolded so quickly that we were all caught with guards down, including my family. Part of my family was able to breakthrough, figuratively speaking, only several hours prior to planned arrests, while the other part was unable to leave the country unfortunately. My sister, brother, daughter-in-law with my grandchildren and now deceased father all stayed in Dushanbe. We attempted to help them leave, but the government seized all of their documents, and my father was prohibited from boarding a plane at the very last moment. They are being held as hostages. They are not only deprived of the right to depart from Tajikistan, but they are also prohibited form visiting relatives and each other. Even my sister-in-law could not visit our own house and my old father even though they live only five kilometres away. They were prohibited from participating even in my late father’s funerals.

I do not know what danger would a 95-year-old man pose to the state and the president personally by meeting with his own 5-year-old great-grandson before his death… My grandchildren are prohibited from speaking on the phone with their own father and myself; secret services constantly remind my brothers and sisters that any contact with me can lead to problems. They are prohibited from receiving any kind of help from us. I have to find out how they are from third parties. And all this is not happening somewhere in North Korea or in a medieval period, but in a member-country of the UN, OSCE and other international organisations. It is being orchestrated by the head of a “democratic country,” who is portrayed on local mass media as a loving son and caring father, who likes posing for photos surrounded by his own and others’ children and promises children, elders and women a bright future. No matter how difficult this is, we must accept things the way they are and move on. They decided to punish children, eldes and women. Everyone has their own moral and values and we must show the values and morals we abide by. That is the only difference.

In addition to family, you have another big “family,” i.e. your fellow party members and IRPT veterans. Many of those—around 15 to 20—have been arrested and already convicted. When I told my friends in Moscow I would be interviewing you, they asked to pose this important question: Have you undertaken attempts to save fellow party members from being imprisoned?

Let me say right away: the number of my fellow party-members who have been convicted is my much higher at over 100, neither 15 nor 20. Over 20 were convicted for life or over 20 years of imprisonment. They were members of the political bureaus and presidium of the party. And local activists as well as chairpersons of local party cells were handed down 10- and 20-year imprisonment terms. So the list is quite extensive, but for some reason all international organisations and news agencies are only speaking of and reporting about 13 individuals, who were arrested initially. But in reality their number is much higher.

Now, speaking of our actions to retrieve them: As soon as we received information that they would all be arrested following a summit of the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation in Dushanbe on September 15, 2015, I immediately called my deputies and hosted a session of the political bureau. By the way, we received that information from reliable sources inside the government—yes, there are people with clear consciences. Even inside the Hitler Germany there were people who tried saving people’s lives from the fascist government, and paid with their own very lives for doing so. We have such heroes as well and they will be remembered in history of Tajikistan as saviours of many innocent people. Their descendants will be proud.

It turns out other party leaders have received information independently as well. Obviously everyone knew what this government was capable of, but everyone was betrayed by the feeling of or confidence in his or her innocence. I realised it was impossible to convince everyone. Each person had an argument as to why not leave the country. Also, every important decision was made by the majority of votes in the party, not singlehandedly by the leader. And everyone was saying, ‘Why should we leave the country when we have nothing to do with these events? Even if the party is shut down, we will continue acting in accordance with laws.’ Everyone was maintaining there was no need for panic or fleeing the country since we are innocent. That is our innate Tajik naivetes and straightforwardness: If I’m not guilty, why should I be leaving the country? If I leave, that means I’m guilty.

This is the logic Zayd Saidov had when he wanted to prove he was innocent in the Tajik court; he returned to Tajikistan to do so. My fellow party-members, too, did not believe they would be arrested. Even my own children did not want to leave home with my son arguing with me all the time that he must stay behind and be alongside others. As soon as the summit guests departed the country, we received information that we had less than 48 hours. We were told this: This matter is in discussions in the highest echelons of power and if they decide to arrest you, we will be obligated to. I realised there was no meaning in discussing the matter of departure at the party level. Instead I have personally instructed everyone to leave the country as soon as possible. Whoever decided to disobey, they are responsible for themselves.

This method worked, and many people started leaving the country. Some were arrested not days but several hours before the planned departures. Some wanted to bid farewell to their parents in remote areas and some others were still in doubt leaving the country was necessary. Some were apprehended in airports or border checkpoints. In other words, the situation was such that only a few minutes played crucial roles in people’s lives. So when I’m asked, “Did you have any plans to save people?” I say we did not and could not possibly have such a plan. I still think we were able to save some people thanks to receiving information from reliable source in a timely manner about the plans to destroy our party. Unfortunately, not all were saved. Every single one of them is dear to my heart as if they were my brother or father. Especially elderly people, I feel very sorry for them. But sorrow alone is not going to help them now. Again, just like in the case of children, everything is to be perceived the way they are in reality, and apply every effort to either release them or make their lives easier. That’s a different matter, of course.

By the way, Buzurgmehr Yorov, a lawyer who was defending my fellow party-members, was also convinced our people were innocent. Now he is in need of protection and justice himself. When the state’s repressions machine is launched and mercilessly ploughing through humans’ lives at full speed, it is almost impossible to seek and secure justice or save someone.

Do you know Yorov? What can you say about him?

I know this man personally. He is a selfless and honest lawyer as well as a justice-loving and decent human. He believed and continues to believe in laws and justice. Perhaps, he is naïve, but that is who he is. I said selfless because Yorov came to me and said he was prepared to defend me in court after the mayor of Dushanbe filed a lawsuit against me for criticising the condition of environment in the capital. He was convinced that the matter was of political nature. As an MP and member of the ecology committee, I had the right to not only criticise the mass cut downs of thousands of trees throughout the city, but I was also simply obligated to do so. Because doing so not only disrupts the ecological balance, it also tarnishes the city’s beauty. Dushanbe was always known for sycamores and green alleyways; they are building tasteless and strange concrete buildings instead of them now.

City authorities sued me allegedly for damaging the image of Dushanbe city. The lawyer Yorov has arisen to defend me. He came to me and said: “I know you are right according to all laws, and you have a personal immunity, including from judicial prosecution, moreover, for your deputy job you fulfilled according to the law. It is your duty as a member of the Ecology Commission”. Of course we lost our case and the court decided that I have to make my apologies for the critics which I have not made yet.

The second time he was dealing with my case when the authorities had started to take away my business. It was in 2014. I always told him: “Buzurgmehr, I know my all cases have a political character and I am going until the end only because I am not surrendering just like that. But your optimism sometimes raises a little hope”. And he was always telling me that the truth and the law are on our side, and in the end we will win. We never won any case with him. But I always respected and loved him and we were always together. Then he started to defend my party peers, and again voluntarily, selflessly. He did not even consult with me. He just considered as his duty to defend those people in need. Therefore he became a victim of his own selflessness and integrity.

I think he will not only go down in history of Tajikistan – his deeds are worthy of world recognition. The man risked his life for the sake of liberties of others and did not wait anything in return. His only shortcoming – he is Tajik and doing it in Tajikistan, not in Europe, not even in Africa. He must be nominated for a prestigious international award. This would be a moral support not only for Buzurgmehr, but for all political prisoners and unfairly convicted. Therefore I think it is my duty to help him as I can.

At this time, the Tajik opposition, activists, and lawyers are broken up into two camps. One group is those who are already convicted or undergoing trial and could possibly imprisoned for long time. The other group is people who fled the country. Can you tell me what you are planning to do in exile? Are you going to establish a committee, movement or society? Are you going to continue your overt political activities?

Over the last year, we took a pause from information to be able to analyse and evaluate all that happened, to weigh the positives and negatives of the situation we are in and to resolve many organisational matters. We started with reforming the inner-party structure. We completed this process over the course of one year, and subsequently came up with a new structure. We decreased the number of party bodies, unified several departments into one in order to minimise party bureaucracy and align everything with the new reality. We established five regional representative offices: three in Europe and two in our region to be close to Tajikistan. We will open new ones if need be in the future.

We were prevented from finishing the party reforms in the country, so we will have to do so abroad. Certain matters, such as changing the party’s name and charter, were postponed for a later time, as they are not really pressing issues at this time. There are more pressing issues at hand: establishing capable structures in the conditions of being scattered and emigration on the one hand and loss of a big number of party leaders and loyal members. Of course we lost them in the physical sense of the word since they are imprisoned; however, they continue providing immense moral support to the younger generation. Sometimes an inmate can have greater influence on the situation than many in freedom. That is the lesson we learn from the history of many great opposition figures who were jailed and imprisoned such as Nelson Mandela and others. Every single political prisoner in Tajikistan is an integral part of our overall struggle, and their courage and dedication are source of strength and inspiration for the new generation of freedom fighters.

Concerning the establishment of a new movement or something else in exile, I think it is a matter of time. Everyone clearly realises that not a single political body is capable of singlehandedly resolve problems the nation of Tajikistan is facing. All creative forces—both exiled and those in Tajikistan—are destined to eventually unite and struggle together toward that goal. What I am against is approaching the matter superficially and chasing yet another grandiose sensation or the banal desire of putting sticks in someone’s wheels.

Establishing a new opposition movement or coalition is a very serious step to take, which requires a very thoroughly thought-out approach. Sometimes we are accused of not willing to unite with other political forces. That is not so. We are interested in unifying no less than others, if not more actually. However, we did have the bitter experience of such coalitions several times. When coalitions are put together in the virtual world of the Internet or for fame alone, they eventually break apart infamously. A serious and firm coalition can only exist when its members are prepared well and share same views, principles and approach to joint efforts. The guarantor of success of any coalition is the preparedness of its members to work in a team and abide by the same rules and principles.

That is the reason why we are not really rushing [over this matter. We are making thorough preparations for establishing a coalition and considering to include into the ranks of our allies not only existing opposition forces but also those groups and individuals who are yet to announce their oppositional views and are awaiting the right moment to do so. There are such forces both inside the country and abroad. The majority want changes, as everyone is tired of endless lies and avarice. The country is headed toward abyss and there are many people who are not indifferent as to the country their children and grandchildren will live in. The current situation is pernicious for both our people and every single one us, and everyone understands that.

Lastly, the most important factor is that there is a common enemy—the current authorities, that is—must not be the only unifying reason for the future coalition. That would be a very big mistake to make, because it could easily be a time bomb. Instead, we must be united by a more important factor; specifically, the country’s future. We must cast the net much wider: what kind of a country we want for ourselves and what society we want to live in? Before we enter the more serious phase of actions, we must identify the principal matters of the country’s future structure and ensure their perpetuity so that nobody can alter or misinterpret them to their own benefit. The current authorities did just that with the General Peace Agreement and the Constitution several times already. Some people think that we must first deal with the current authorities, and then see and agree on matters. That is a very short-sighted position. If not us, then life itself will take care of these current authorities since that is the fate of any authoritative regime. Instead, we must think about the country’s future in order to prevent the replication of events in Syria and Libya in Tajikistan.

Thank you for this interview!

Interviewer: Daniil Kislov

Fergana international information agency.

“TADSCHIKISTAN 2017” – Amnesty International

Die Handlungsspielräume für friedliche Kritiker wurden immer enger. Die Behörden verwiesen auf die nationale Sicherheit und den Antiterrorkampf, um zunehmend härtere Beschränkungen der Rechte auf Meinungs- und Vereinigungsfreiheit zu rechtfertigen. Mitglieder der verbotenen Oppositionspartei Islamische Partei der Wiedergeburt Tadschikistans (IRPT) wurden nach Anklagen wegen Terrorismus in extrem unfairen Geheimverfahren zu langen bzw. lebenslangen Haftstrafen verurteilt. Vorwürfe, sie seien gefoltert worden, um “Geständnisse” zu erzwingen, wurden nicht wirksam und unparteiisch untersucht. Rechtsanwälte, die IRPT-Mitglieder vertraten, mussten mit Schikanen, willkürlicher Inhaftierung, strafrechtlicher Verfolgung und langen Haftstrafen aufgrund politisch motivierter Vorwürfe rechnen.

HINTERGRUND

Bei einem Referendum im Mai 2016 wurden umfassende Änderungen der Verfassung angenommen. Dabei wurde u. a. die Begrenzung der Amtszeit des Staatspräsidenten abgeschafft, wodurch es Präsident Emomalii Rachmon nun möglich ist, über die nächsten Wahlen hinaus im Amt zu bleiben. Zudem wurden auf Religion und Atheismus basierende politische Parteien verboten. Im November 2016 wurde “Beleidigung des Staatsführers” zum Straftatbestand erklärt.

Mindestens 170 Personen, die beschuldigt wurden, an bewaffneten Zusammenstößen zwischen Regierungstruppen und bewaffneten Gruppen in der Hauptstadt Duschanbe im September 2015 beteiligt gewesen zu sein, wurden strafrechtlich verfolgt, schuldig gesprochen und zu Gefängnisstrafen verurteilt. Nach Ansicht der Behörden hatte es sich dabei um einen Umsturzversuch des ehemaligen stellvertretenden Verteidigungsministers Abdukhalim Nazarzoda gehandelt. Aufgrund der nahezu lückenlosen staatlichen Kontrolle der Medienberichterstattung hatte die Öffentlichkeit so gut wie keine Möglichkeit, die offizielle Darstellung unabhängig zu überprüfen. Dies nährte wiederum Vorbehalte hinsichtlich der Strafverfolgungsmaßnahmen.

Im Exil lebende Mitglieder der verbotenen Oppositionspartei IRPT sowie Vertreter der oppositionellen Gruppe 24 besuchten im September 2016 das alljährliche OSZE-Implementierungstreffen der menschlichen Dimension in der polnischen Hauptstadt Warschau und hielten dort eine Mahnwache ab. Es gab Berichte darüber, dass Polizei und Sicherheitskräfte als Vergeltung für diesen friedlichen Protest in Warschau Familienangehörige der Protestierenden in Tadschikistan bedrohten, willkürlich inhaftierten, verhörten und in einigen Fällen körperlich attackierten. Die Regierungsdelegation verließ die Konferenz vorzeitig, um dagegen zu protestieren, dass neben anderen Vertretern der Zivilgesellschaft auch eine “in Tadschikistan verbotene Terrororganisation” zugelassen worden war.

UNFAIRE GERICHTSVERFAHREN

Die Behörden bestritten vehement, dass 14 führende IRPT-Mitglieder wegen ihrer mutmaßlichen Beteiligung an den bewaffneten Zusammenstößen im September 2015 Opfer politisch motivierter Strafverfolgung, unfairer Gerichtsverfahren sowie von Folter und anderen Misshandlungen wurden. Das Verfahren gegen die IRPT-Mitglieder vor dem Obersten Gericht begann im Februar 2016 und fand in der Untersuchungshafteinrichtung des Staatsausschusses für Nationale Sicherheit im Geheimen statt. Im Juni 2016 wurden alle Angeklagten schuldig gesprochen. Die beiden stellvertretenden IRPT-Vorsitzenden Umarali Khisainov (auch bekannt unter dem Namen Saidumur Khusaini) und Makhmadali Khaitov (Mukhammadalii Hait) erhielten lebenslange Haftstrafen. Zarafo Khujaeva (Rakhmoni), die zu zwei Jahren Gefängnis verurteilt wurde, kam am 5. September 2016 nach einer Begnadigung durch den Präsidenten frei. Die übrigen Angeklagten erhielten Haftstrafen zwischen 14 und 28 Jahren.

Die zunächst spärlichen offiziellen Informationen über die Strafverfolgung der IRPT-Mitglieder, wie z. B. die Anklagepunkte, waren bereits 2015 aus offiziellen Quellen, wie den Webseiten der Generalstaatsanwaltschaft und der staatlichen Nachrichtenagentur Khovar, entfernt worden. Jegliche weiteren Informationen wurden unterdrückt. Die Rechtsbeistände der Angeklagten mussten eine Geheimhaltungsvereinbarung in Bezug auf sämtliche Einzelheiten des Falls und des Verfahrens unterzeichnen. Das Urteil und die offiziellen Unterlagen des Gerichtsverfahrens wurden nicht veröffentlicht. Im August 2016 tauchte im Internet eine Kopie des Urteils aus anonymer Quelle auf. Die Generalstaatsanwaltschaft lehnte es ab, sich zur Echtheit des Dokuments zu äußern, die mutmaßliche Quelle wurde dennoch strafrechtlich verfolgt (siehe unten).

Im März 2016 äußerte sich der UN-Sonderberichterstatter über Meinungsfreiheit besorgt darüber, dass “die gegen die IRPT ergriffenen drastischen Maßnahmen einen ernsten Rückschritt für ein offenes politisches Klima bedeuten”. Er bemängelte, dass die Regierung die IRPT und deren Mitglieder schwerer Verbrechen beschuldige, es jedoch ablehne, der Öffentlichkeit den Zugang zum Verfahren und zur Beweislage zu gewähren.

VERFOLGUNG VON STRAFVERTEIDIGERN

Anwälte, die an der Verteidigung der 14 IRPT-Mitglieder beteiligt waren, wurden schikaniert, eingeschüchtert und in einigen Fällen willkürlich festgenommen und strafrechtlich verfolgt. Im Oktober 2016 verurteilte das Stadtgericht Duschanbe die beiden Anwälte Buzurgmekhr Yorov und Nuriddin Makhkamov, die mehrere angeklagte IRPT-Mitglieder vertraten, in einem unfairen Gerichtsverfahren zu 23 bzw. 21 Jahren Haft. Abgesehen von der ersten gerichtlichen Anhörung im Mai 2016 waren die Medien und die Öffentlichkeit von sämtlichen Sitzungen ausgeschlossen. Beide Anwälte wurden schuldig gesprochen, weil sie “zu nationaler, rassischer, lokaler oder religiöser Feindseligkeit angestachelt”, Betrug verübt und “öffentlich zum gewaltsamen Umsturz der verfassungsmäßigen Ordnung der Republik Tadschikistan” sowie “zu extremistischen Taten” aufgerufen hätten. Buzurgmekhr Yorov wurde überdies der Fälschung für schuldig befunden. Buzurgmekhr Yorov und Nuriddin Makhkamov bestritten jegliche Straftat und legten Rechtsmittel ein, über die Ende 2016 noch nicht entschieden worden war. Sollten die Schuldsprüche nicht vollständig aufgehoben werden, könnten die beiden nach ihrer Freilassung nie wieder als Anwälte arbeiten.

Am 22. August 2016 wurde Buzurgmekhr Yorovs Bruder Jamshed Yorov, der ebenfalls als Strafverteidiger im IRPT-Verfahren tätig war, wegen “Verbreitung von Staatsgeheimnissen” festgenommen. Man warf ihm vor, das Urteil des Obersten Gerichts im IRPT-Verfahren unerlaubt veröffentlicht zu haben. Am 30. September kam er wieder frei.

Am 12. Dezember 2016 begann in der Untersuchungshafteinrichtung Nr. 1 in Duschanbe ein zweiter Prozess gegen Buzurgmekhr Yorov, in dem man ihn beschuldigte, in seinem Schlussplädoyer vor dem Stadtgericht Duschanbe das Gericht missachtet sowie Regierungsvertreter beleidigt zu haben.

FOLTER UND ANDERE MISSHANDLUNGEN

Im Mai 2016 wurden die gesetzlichen Regelungen zum Schutz von Inhaftierten gegen Folter und andere Misshandlungen verbessert. Die maximal zulässige Zeit, die eine Person ohne Anklage in Haft gehalten werden kann, wurde auf drei Tage verkürzt, als Haftbeginn gilt künftig der Moment, in dem der Freiheitsentzug tatsächlich beginnt. Der Inhaftierte hat vom Augenblick des Freiheitsentzugs an das Recht auf vertraulichen Zugang zu einem Anwalt, und Verdächtige müssen vor einer zeitweisen Inhaftierung medizinisch untersucht werden.

Nach wie vor gab es keine unabhängigen Organe, um Folter und andere Misshandlungen zu untersuchen. Die NGO Koalition gegen Folter registrierte 60 Beschwerden wegen Folter, ging jedoch davon aus, dass die tatsächliche Zahl der Fälle wesentlich höher lag.

Im September 2016 nahm der UN-Menschenrechtsrat das Ergebnis der Allgemeinen Regelmäßigen Überprüfung Tadschikistans an. Die Regierung lehnte die Empfehlung ab, das Fakultativprotokoll zum Übereinkommen gegen Folter und andere grausame, unmenschliche oder erniedrigende Behandlung oder Strafe zu ratifizieren und einen nationalen Mechanismus zur Verhütung von Folter einzurichten. Sie akzeptierte allerdings die Empfehlung, das zweite Fakultativprotokoll zum Internationalen Pakt über bürgerliche und politische Rechte zu ratifizieren und die Todesstrafe ganz abzuschaffen.

RECHT AUF VEREINIGUNGSFREIHEIT

Das Justizministerium legte 2016 vorläufige Bestimmungen für die Umsetzung des geänderten Gesetzes über öffentliche Vereinigungen vor, das NGOs dazu verpflichtet, jegliche finanzielle Zuwendung aus dem Ausland zu melden. In den Umsetzungsbestimmungen wurde jedoch weder ein Zeitraum festgelegt, in dem die Behörde darüber entschieden haben muss, noch wurde festgelegt, ob das Geld vor der offiziellen Genehmigung verwendet werden darf. Die Bestimmungen sahen außerdem vor, dass Inspektionen von NGOs nur einmal innerhalb von zwei Jahren erfolgen sollen, allerdings gab es in Bezug auf diese Regel und die Gründe für Inspektionen einen großen Ermessensspielraum.

Das vom Steuerausschuss angestrengte Liquidationsverfahren gegen die etablierte Organisation Nota Bene, die sich für Demokratie und Menschenrechte einsetzt, wurde im Januar 2016 von einem Bezirksgericht zurückgewiesen.

RECHT AUF FREIE MEINUNGSÄUßERUNG

Die Behörden verhängten 2016 weitere Einschränkungen gegen die Medien und begrenzten den Zugang zu unabhängiger Information noch stärker. Ein fünf Jahre gültiges Dekret der Regierung vom August 2016 gab dem Staatlichen Rundfunkausschuss das Recht, die Inhalte sämtlicher Fernseh- und Radiosendungen “zu regulieren und zu kontrollieren”.

Unabhängige Medienunternehmen und einzelne Journalisten wurden durch Polizei und Sicherheitsdienste eingeschüchtert und schikaniert, wenn sie über das IRPT-Verfahren und andere politisch heikle Themen berichteten. Einige sahen sich gezwungen, das Land zu verlassen. Im November 2016 kündigten die unabhängige Tageszeitung Nigoh sowie die unabhängige Internetseite Tojnews ihre Schließung an, da “die Bedingungen für unabhängige Medien und freien Journalismus nicht mehr gegeben sind”. Nigoh hatte über das Verfahren gegen den Anwalt Buzurgmekhr Yorov berichtet.

Die Behörden wiesen Internetprovider nach wie vor an, den Zugang zu bestimmten Nachrichtenportalen und sozialen Medien zu blockieren, bestritten dies jedoch öffentlich. Personen und Gruppen, die von den Maßnahmen betroffen waren, konnten diese nicht wirksam vor Gericht anfechten. Eine Verordnung der Regierung verpflichtete Internetprovider und Telekommunikationsunternehmen dazu, ihre Dienste ausschließlich über ein neues zentrales Kommunikationszentrum der staatseigenen Firma Tajiktelecom zur Verfügung zu stellen. Im März 2016 stellte der UN-Sonderberichterstatter über Meinungsfreiheit mit Besorgnis fest, dass die umfassende Blockade von Internetseiten und Netzwerken, darunter auch Mobilfunkdienste, unverhältnismäßig und mit internationalen Standards nicht vereinbar sei.

RECHTE AUF WASSER UND SANITÄRVERSORGUNG

Im Juli 2016 veröffentlichte der UN-Sonderberichterstatter über das Menschenrecht auf einwandfreies Trinkwasser und Sanitärversorgung seinen Bericht über Tadschikistan. Darin hieß es, dass nahezu 40 % der Bevölkerung und fast die Hälfte der ländlichen Bevölkerung auf Wasserquellen zurückgriff, die oft unzureichend waren oder nicht den Qualitätsmaßstäben für Trinkwasser entsprachen. Er stellte fest, dass dies eine erhebliche Belastung für Frauen und Kinder bedeutete, die zum Teil vier bis sechs Stunden täglich mit Wasserholen beschäftigt waren. Der Sonderberichterstatter wies außerdem darauf hin, dass sich der Mangel an Wasser und sanitären Anlagen insbesondere in öffentlichen Institutionen unmittelbar negativ auf andere Rechte auswirke, wie etwa die Rechte auf Gesundheit, Bildung, Arbeit und Leben. Er drängte die Regierung, für einen gleichberechtigten Zugang zu Wasser und sanitären Anlagen zu sorgen und sich der Bedürfnisse besonders schutzbedürftiger Gruppen anzunehmen, darunter Frauen und Mädchen in ländlichen Regionen, umgesiedelte Personen, Flüchtlinge, Asylsuchende und Staatenlose.

Die Regierung akzeptierte die im Rahmen der Allgemeinen Regelmäßigen Überprüfung erteilte Empfehlung, den Zugang zu sicherem Trinkwasser zu verbessern, lehnte jedoch die Empfehlung ab, das Fakultativprotokoll zum Internationalen Pakt über wirtschaftliche, soziale und kulturelle Rechte zu ratifizieren.

Amnesty International

2017

CAP: Interview with Muhiddin Kabiri, Leader of the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan In-Exile

“I do not regret that we have chosen the path of tolerance and restraint”

Can you comment on the scandal that happened at the International Conference in Iran?1 Do you think the inviting party was trying to facilitate a dialogue between you and the official representatives of the clergy of Tajikistan, or did they simply underestimate the situation?

I myself do not understand all this hysteria about my participation in this conference. Why wasn’t this note addressed to Germany, Austria, Belgium, Switzerland or the United States, where I took part in similar events? More so, as I was involved in the work of the annual conference on a regular basis, I saw that the organizers did not expect things to turn out that way, and they did not fully understand what happened. Most likely, some people [in the government of Tajikistan] were looking to cause a scandal for several reasons. Firstly, given the strained relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, it was necessary to attract the attention of the Saudis as a potential ally before the president’s trip to Riyadh and try to get some money out of them. Second, the authorities wanted to hide away from public attention some issues of the Tajik-Iranian relations, in particular, the hundreds of millions of dollars that Iranian billionaire Zanjani left in Dushanbe, which the authorities of Tajikistan do not wish to talk about. Also, they probably were trying to divert the attention of Iran, one of the guarantors of the country’s Peace Agreement, 2 from the clear violation, by the Tajik authorities, of the latter. By the way, in my speech at the conference and in separate meetings, I criticized Iran and other guarantors of the Peace Agreement for failure to perform their obligations before the Tajik people.

It was very recently that the IRP, as the de facto second largest party in the country, convened its congresses and was professionally engaged in politics, recruiting young people and successfully competing with the official authorities. Today, the party is ruined and outlawed. What do you think, where was a mistake, of the party as a whole and yours as its leader?

If we got into a difficult situation, then at some point it was due to a mistake. In the very beginning of the campaign, when the government started to break the Peace Agreement and gradually began oppressing not only us, but the entire opposition, pushing us to the sidelines of the country’s social and political life, many experts, including those who are close to the corridors of power, had been telling us that the policy of tolerance and moderation will eventually turn against us. Later, with increasing pressure on the Party, similar assumptions have been expressed even by some of our supporters, who demanded a tougher response from us. They argued that we have been acting as if we were living in a society where the government has a high political culture and acts strictly in accordance with the laws and generally accepted moral and political norms. We were criticized for ignoring the fact that the current government has come to power by force and recognizes only force, in its most brutal form.

And it was by force that opposition once prompted the authorities to sit at the negotiating table. Apparently, the authorities did not forget this and all this time were thinking of revenge. Knowing about our preference to dialogue and tolerance, and abusing it amid general apathy of society towards hard and massive protests, the government has acted deceitfully. With full control both over the legislative and executive branches, the authorities could not tolerate a few members of the opposition, both in the government and parliament. This is telling that peace and coexistence with the opponents were forced upon them, and as soon as the authorities got the opportunity to get rid of the imposed peace, they did so.

We cannot say that we were so naive that we did not see this and did not understand what the government’s actions led to. But we had hoped that rationality would eventually prevail, and our opponents in power at some stage, realizing the danger of these actions, would stop. Here, apparently, we were wrong. But then there is another question: what would have happened if we had acted in the same way as the authorities? A new civil war? Devastation and new casualties? Even after what has been done to the Peace Agreement and to us, I do not regret that we have chosen the path of tolerance and restraint. I am sure tomorrow our people will recognize that we made the right choice.

When the pressure on the party began, did you make any attempt to soften the blow, to fight it by legal means?

The Party as a whole, and I as its leader have done everything we could. A list of all our actions in this direction would take a lot of time and space, as too much has been done. After the Minutes 32-20 appeared, 3 I wrote two letters to the president, first as a deputy of the parliament and a second time at the request of the IRP political council, as the leader of the party. I requested a meeting with him. I believe that the topic I wanted to discuss at the meeting was already known to the other side, as I conveyed my thoughts to other high-ranked officials. Probably, there could be no legitimate and logical answer to them and such meetings would not fit into a plan. Then, the IRP political council invited GKNB (state security committee), Interior Ministry and Prosecutor’s Office, Committee for Youth, Women’s Affairs and the Committee on Religious Affairs to engage in joint projects, establish trusted relations and eliminate all contradictions. Unfortunately, all our attempts have failed. During private and mostly casual meetings and conversations, some officials have expressed their regret that our constructivism does not find support and understanding at the top.

Why do you think that nothing has worked?

Because the decision was made at the highest level to close down the party at all costs. Of course, our opponents would like it to happen without too much noise, and would even have wanted us to self-liquidate to avoid the charges in violating the peace agreement and avoid having any black spots in history. When they began to take away the party and personal property, we were given a hint that there was a chance to change the situation. Some officials advised us to announce self-liquidation. In exchange, we were promised not only that we would be able to keep our properties, but also additional benefits, including job positions. All our arguments about national interests and law, and ultimately such notions as honor and dignity, were met with the cold response that this is all made up for the public, but a real government policy does not recognize these terms. Some of them, more well-read would refer to Machiavelli, who allowed all methods in politics, including blackmail, bribery, cruelty, and even murder.

What can you say in response to the serious allegations put forward by the government, and generally to the fact that the Islamic Renaissance Party has been classified as a terrorist organization?

Unfortunately, in today’s world there is no common approach and a common interpretation of the concept of “terrorism,” and at times the situation becomes absurd. Any opponent could be considered as a terrorist, especially if the opponent is also a Muslim and wears some Islamic clothes. Recently, at a conference, I suggested that it is necessary at the level of the UN Security Council or the UN General Assembly to adopt a document defining the concept. So far, with its absence, many, including dictatorial regimes, make use of the situation to delegitimize their opponents as terrorists. In fact, terrorism implies violent actions that are aimed at spreading fear. Now the question arises, who does it in Tajikistan? Is it the IRP, which was claimed to be and is still accused of being excessively tolerant and loyal, or the officials who take hostages, even the elderly and children, and force them to testify against their relatives? In other words, we believe these charges are pointless, and it is good that the international community does not take them seriously.

Do you take any effort to help your followers and colleagues who have been imprisoned? According to international experts, there are about 200 people who have been detained, or do you have any other information?

The problem is that there are no certain numbers of detainees. We estimated there are more than 150 people. Some relatives do not report the arrests, thinking that this will complicate the situation even more. They hope that they can somehow resolve the situation informally. By unconfirmed data, more than 200 people were detained and some have already faced charges. Of course, we do everything possible to help them. But, as the experience of Zayd Saidov4 shows, as well as that of other political prisoners in Tajikistan, political and legal support does not help the fate of the people, leaving only moral and material means of support. But we still do provide all kinds of assistance.

What kind of action do you expect from international organizations on the situation surrounding the IRP? Do you intend to apply there, if you have not done so already, or what are the results if you have already applied?

As you know, in the summer we applied to the UN and other international organizations, as well as to guarantors of the Peace Agreement. There was a reaction from the EU, but the strongest response came from international human rights organizations, even though we did not apply to them. Amnesty International, Freedom House, Human Rights Watch and others condemned the actions of the authorities.

Why do you think that international organizations and guarantors of the Peace Agreement have been silent?

We are also surprised by the inaction of the UN and the guarantors. We understand that everyone is busy resolving the ongoing conflicts in Ukraine, Syria and Yemen, but that does not mean that you can forget about old duties. In recent years, there has been a lot of criticism towards the UN and other international organizations that they only intervene after the crisis begins and cannot or do not want to prevent them. Though there are dozens of programs and centers for preventive diplomacy with multimillion-dollar budgets…

In December, you were planning to come to Washington to participate in a roundtable on the human rights situation in Tajikistan, but could not get a visa. Can you tell us more about this? When did you learn that you would not be able to get a visa? What was the official reason for the refusal?

Firstly, I was not denied a visa. Because I applied to the US consulate in a country in which I am not a permanent resident, and just a few days before the conference, I was told that the e-mail invitation for the interview from the consulate came just one day before the date of entry into the United States. At that time, I was outside of Germany, and was not able to, even though I wished to, get a visa in one day and arrive for the conference. Therefore, I had to participate online. Yet I am aware of other versions of why I did not go to the United States, or how I “was not let in the US.”

On December 15, it became known that your family members were detained in Tajikistan and then released. You have linked this episode with the fact that the authorities became aware of your intention to participate in the roundtable on human rights in Washington. Do you still think so, or do you link it with the overall context of efforts to force you come back to Tajikistan? Actually, it is connected with the conference and several other meetings that are organized by our supporters, among whom were members of our family. It’s not for nothing that my father and other relatives of the detainees have asked us not to meet with foreigners, organize pickets near the embassy, or speak at various events abroad. We have not been in contact with our families for a long time, for reasons of safety, and they could not know with whom and where we meet and what we do. Moreover, these are old people who do not follow politics. They said what they have been instructed to say and did so on camera.

How do you feel after numerous episodes related to the detention, interrogation and tremendous pressure on your family back home? How do you cope with all this?

We try to remain calm and not give in to emotions, even though it is very difficult sometimes. The other day, my 95-year-old father was detained a second time and was removed from his flight to Istanbul, where he wanted to go for medical treatment and visit grandchildren. I cannot find words to convey all this. I received some messages that were sent by people who remained at home (our supporters and relatives). These letters are written in simple language, with mistakes, sometimes unintelligible. But they convey everything they thought and felt at the time. This should be read … And saved for history … These are not the notes from the siege of Leningrad, or the concentration camps of Auschwitz, but these are notes from the citizens of a legal and democratic state of the 21st century, the relatives of “enemies of the people.” We and our party members are deeply inspired by the courage and perseverance of our friends under arrest.

What are you going to do next?

We have already held the first meeting of the IRP Political Council abroad and have set goals for the near future. We will keep our peaceful tactics, although it is becoming more difficult to control people’s emotions. No wonder, why more and more young protesting people join radical and terrorist organizations. But we are doing everything to prevent the radicalization of our supporters.

The Central Asia Program

27 January 2016